The “New Normal” in China: A Neopolitical Turn, a New Era, or a Reversion?

Maintaining the rule of the CCP, to this day, remains the Party’s top priority. To a large extent, this has been a two-pronged attack through promoting the legitimacy of the CCP and stifling public dissent. Quelling social unrest and outbursts of public dissent has been a methodological and straightforward process (utilizing censorship and pathways for the public to express tolerable complaints) since the Tiananmen Square protests, but ensuring legitimacy in the eyes of the public has arisen as a much more complicated issue. During the Maoist period, ideology and revolution served as the pillars of legitimacy; through the current Era, astronomical economic growth has been used to justify single-party rule of the CCP. Now, however, there has been a turn in the political climate of the PRC, coinciding with an economic slow down that threatens legitimacy of the CCP and consequently social stability within China.

Authors Jeremy Wallace and Carl Minzner both agree there is an observable change in the political atmosphere under Xi Jinping. Whereas Wallace argues that a “neopolitical turn” has occurred, replacing the technocratic with the political under the larger umbrella of continued economic reform, Minzner argues that the collateral of rapid economic development is surfacing and will require an undoing of the institutionalization that pervaded the reform era.

Here, I argue that whether or not the Reform Era has ended largely depends on the extent to which Xi unravels that era’s institutionalization in the next several years, especially considering a few key upcoming decisions such as surpassing the ten-year term limit for the Presidency. Further, I view the guiding framework for the direction of the political climate to be solely dependent on perceived regime threats: the only constant during this transitional turn is that the CCP will act in accordance with what is best for maintaining regime control. The adaptive authoritarianism constructed in post-Mao China will continue to adapt, casting aside any guise of the rule of law or of political liberalization if need be.

Though I believe the most accurate analysis will stem from Xi’s upcoming decisions, there is some evidence to consider now for future predictions. Ideology seems to be on the rise within China, and two prominent aspects come to mind: international disputes and the revival of Confucianism. The numerous political confrontations regarding the South China Sea has spurred a wave of Chinese nationalism. Boisterous claims by the CCP leadership sparks waves of support among the general populace (for example, the outcry and looting of Japanese businesses after the Japanese PM visited the Yasukuni Shrine). The CCP may be using rallying calls to unite its citizens in the face of unrest from economic downturn. Second, mentions of Confucianism in political rhetoric and increased investment in Confucian education serves the Party’s interest as well: notions of obedience and harmony are politically expedient, given the current political climate.

What is important about this use of ideology is that it is reminiscent of pre-Reform Era political strategy. As Wallace argues, it is a neopolitical turn. Similarly, as Minzner argues, it unravels much of what the Reform Era worked to institutionalize. Personally, I lean toward Wallace’s current assessment that the Reform Era has been shifted in a new direction, but has not ended. Many of the economic reforms brought about during this period would cause huge dissent if reversed. As for the social reforms and further democratization that typically accompanies globalization and economic reform, the CCP security apparatus has been continually suppressing this potential source of public dissent since Tiananmen. Thus, the heavy-handedness of Xi’s rule represents a bolstering of defense against unrest that will surely follow continued economic slowdown, while the core fundamentals of the institutionalization of economic reform will remain intact.

Can’t All Tables Be Turned?

 

The Net Delusion by Evgeny Morozov discusses the internet and the opportunities it provides from a perspective that is very different than what is normally heard. In this book, Morozov calls attention to the two problems he sees with society and the internet: cyber-utopianism (the tendency of people, especially reporters and politicians to not see the negative aspects of using the internet) and internet-centrism (the belief that the internet can single handedly change the way global politics works). The author shows how this tool that many have considered to be a major break in spreading democracy may actually be the greatest hindrance to the spread of democracy, and he does so by using specific examples of governments’ responses to Twitter outbursts and Facebook rallies.

I think that Morozov has a perspective that is too pessimistic regarding the internet’s role in advancing democracy. Throughout the book he makes it seem as though the internet and people using it to incite change is generally a bad idea. I understand his position, and I understand that using the internet, especially social networks such as Facebook, Vcontakte, Twitter, and YouTube when you are filling it with personal information gives Authoritarian regimes a unique advantage that, to quote Morozov, “the KGB would have literally killed for.” There is no question that people who are skeptical of the government in Authoritarian regimes are giving up their privacy and probably their prospects for a life free of trouble with the government when they get involved with their information and opinions on the internet – but does that mean they just shouldn’t do it? Morozov focuses a lot on the negative consequences of using the internet, such as text messaging being used to increase social problems in Africa or to link extremists groups to one another in Somalia. Technology has made it a lot easier for terrorists group to interact, whether via text message or networking apps such as WhatsApp, it has allowed for the Belarusian government to search citizens’ Facebook profiles and shut down those who have an inclination to question the authorities, and it has driven Authoritarian regimes to reap the benefits of a connected society as much as a democracy has; but the internet is also a major force of sharing information. Morozov focuses on the negative sharing, such as the extremists, the pedophiles, and the propaganda that regimes who constrict human rights have when they have access to the internet but I can’t understand how he does not turn the tables and see that these disadvantages are just as equally met by the learning now available to girls who cannot go to school, the blogs (perhaps ones very similar to this one) that give insights to those living under Authoritarian regimes, the television shows available across the internet that show not only Western ideals but are more and more often echoning the importance of equality across groups. I see Morozov’s point, there are definitely negatives to the internet, and to be blind of those negatives would to be ignorant. But these negatives, to me at least, do not come anywhere near close enough to making the internet a tool that those hoping to spread democracy should abandon – there is no better tool. Morozov argues that it wasn’t the Twitter feeds that allowed a revolution to happen, that is was the people, and he is right. But those people were motivated by what they were seeing, what those around them were feeling, and that knowledge came from the internet. Should we be weary of what we put online? Yes. Should democratic governments think that the internet will take care of promoting democracy on its own? No. There needs to be a balance, Morozov is correct about that.

The KGB may want you to join Facebook, and Authoritarian rulers across the globe may want you to as well, but as someone with high hopes for a world where information is shared without limitations and anyone, regardless of where they live or who they are, can make a change, so do I.