China’s Current Changes

Even in less than fifty pages, the readings this week make it clear that China is undergoing an economic and institutional revolution driven by changes in policies and norms. Both Wallace’s “The New Normal: A Neopolitical Turn in China’s Reform Era” and Minzner’s “China After the Reform Era” show that since Mao, China has undergone numerous changes, but perhaps the greatest and most impactful changes are those that have been promulgated by the current Chinese leader Xi Jinping. According to Minzner, Xi Jinping has succeeded in recreated a Mao-like popularity, becoming a personalistic ruler. While Minzer focuses a lot on Xi Jinping’s image in Chinese society as a backbone for his popular support, Wallace focuses instead on the reforms that have been led by Xi Jinping in China, and the effects that these decisions have had on both maintaining the Chinese economy and ensuring that the Chinese regime has legitimate claims to power.

Wallace argues that the first of two important changes seen under Xi Jinping is the centralization of power. The drive for this is represented in the new power and popularity of the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The most important aspect of the CCDI’s rejuvenation in China is the fact that it is now prosecuting high ranking Party officials. This is something that Xi Jinping has done not only to secure political power against his competitors, but also to help legitimize the state while targeting corruption.

The second of these important changes is a change in the perspective of the politicians, more specifically in the goals that they have as those in power have switched from the technocrats of the past to those belonging to the neopolitical wave that is currently sweeping the nation. While Minzner also mentions the new political and power dynamics in China, he focuses more on the economic future of the regime, and the effects that the decisions of past leaders will have on Xi Jinping’s ability to react.

As someone who has little background knowledge in China, I thought that the most interesting parts of each of this week’s readings were not the author’s analysis of the Chinese economy or predictions on the future of Chinese politics, but rather that both author’s allude to the fact that Xi Jinping is operating via self-reflection, not only on his past decisions but on the past decisions of all authoritarian leaders. This is more prevalent in the Minzer article. On multiple occasions Minzer mentions that Xi Jinping’s decisions, and the decisions of many Chinese leaders, were motivated by the failures of the Soviet Union. An example of this can be seen in the decision to encourage retirement from leadership positions, to spark economic development, and to maintain a Party that, for the most part, views the people within its borders as equals.  As this class comes to a close, it is both rewarding and concerning to know that Authoritarian rulers are using what we’ve learned as motivators for their decisions; that the topics and case studies we’ve been discussing are not just theory on paper.

Can’t All Tables Be Turned?

 

The Net Delusion by Evgeny Morozov discusses the internet and the opportunities it provides from a perspective that is very different than what is normally heard. In this book, Morozov calls attention to the two problems he sees with society and the internet: cyber-utopianism (the tendency of people, especially reporters and politicians to not see the negative aspects of using the internet) and internet-centrism (the belief that the internet can single handedly change the way global politics works). The author shows how this tool that many have considered to be a major break in spreading democracy may actually be the greatest hindrance to the spread of democracy, and he does so by using specific examples of governments’ responses to Twitter outbursts and Facebook rallies.

I think that Morozov has a perspective that is too pessimistic regarding the internet’s role in advancing democracy. Throughout the book he makes it seem as though the internet and people using it to incite change is generally a bad idea. I understand his position, and I understand that using the internet, especially social networks such as Facebook, Vcontakte, Twitter, and YouTube when you are filling it with personal information gives Authoritarian regimes a unique advantage that, to quote Morozov, “the KGB would have literally killed for.” There is no question that people who are skeptical of the government in Authoritarian regimes are giving up their privacy and probably their prospects for a life free of trouble with the government when they get involved with their information and opinions on the internet – but does that mean they just shouldn’t do it? Morozov focuses a lot on the negative consequences of using the internet, such as text messaging being used to increase social problems in Africa or to link extremists groups to one another in Somalia. Technology has made it a lot easier for terrorists group to interact, whether via text message or networking apps such as WhatsApp, it has allowed for the Belarusian government to search citizens’ Facebook profiles and shut down those who have an inclination to question the authorities, and it has driven Authoritarian regimes to reap the benefits of a connected society as much as a democracy has; but the internet is also a major force of sharing information. Morozov focuses on the negative sharing, such as the extremists, the pedophiles, and the propaganda that regimes who constrict human rights have when they have access to the internet but I can’t understand how he does not turn the tables and see that these disadvantages are just as equally met by the learning now available to girls who cannot go to school, the blogs (perhaps ones very similar to this one) that give insights to those living under Authoritarian regimes, the television shows available across the internet that show not only Western ideals but are more and more often echoning the importance of equality across groups. I see Morozov’s point, there are definitely negatives to the internet, and to be blind of those negatives would to be ignorant. But these negatives, to me at least, do not come anywhere near close enough to making the internet a tool that those hoping to spread democracy should abandon – there is no better tool. Morozov argues that it wasn’t the Twitter feeds that allowed a revolution to happen, that is was the people, and he is right. But those people were motivated by what they were seeing, what those around them were feeling, and that knowledge came from the internet. Should we be weary of what we put online? Yes. Should democratic governments think that the internet will take care of promoting democracy on its own? No. There needs to be a balance, Morozov is correct about that.

The KGB may want you to join Facebook, and Authoritarian rulers across the globe may want you to as well, but as someone with high hopes for a world where information is shared without limitations and anyone, regardless of where they live or who they are, can make a change, so do I.