Maintaining the rule of the CCP, to this day, remains the Party’s top priority. To a large extent, this has been a two-pronged attack through promoting the legitimacy of the CCP and stifling public dissent. Quelling social unrest and outbursts of public dissent has been a methodological and straightforward process (utilizing censorship and pathways for the public to express tolerable complaints) since the Tiananmen Square protests, but ensuring legitimacy in the eyes of the public has arisen as a much more complicated issue. During the Maoist period, ideology and revolution served as the pillars of legitimacy; through the current Era, astronomical economic growth has been used to justify single-party rule of the CCP. Now, however, there has been a turn in the political climate of the PRC, coinciding with an economic slow down that threatens legitimacy of the CCP and consequently social stability within China.
Authors Jeremy Wallace and Carl Minzner both agree there is an observable change in the political atmosphere under Xi Jinping. Whereas Wallace argues that a “neopolitical turn” has occurred, replacing the technocratic with the political under the larger umbrella of continued economic reform, Minzner argues that the collateral of rapid economic development is surfacing and will require an undoing of the institutionalization that pervaded the reform era.
Here, I argue that whether or not the Reform Era has ended largely depends on the extent to which Xi unravels that era’s institutionalization in the next several years, especially considering a few key upcoming decisions such as surpassing the ten-year term limit for the Presidency. Further, I view the guiding framework for the direction of the political climate to be solely dependent on perceived regime threats: the only constant during this transitional turn is that the CCP will act in accordance with what is best for maintaining regime control. The adaptive authoritarianism constructed in post-Mao China will continue to adapt, casting aside any guise of the rule of law or of political liberalization if need be.
Though I believe the most accurate analysis will stem from Xi’s upcoming decisions, there is some evidence to consider now for future predictions. Ideology seems to be on the rise within China, and two prominent aspects come to mind: international disputes and the revival of Confucianism. The numerous political confrontations regarding the South China Sea has spurred a wave of Chinese nationalism. Boisterous claims by the CCP leadership sparks waves of support among the general populace (for example, the outcry and looting of Japanese businesses after the Japanese PM visited the Yasukuni Shrine). The CCP may be using rallying calls to unite its citizens in the face of unrest from economic downturn. Second, mentions of Confucianism in political rhetoric and increased investment in Confucian education serves the Party’s interest as well: notions of obedience and harmony are politically expedient, given the current political climate.
What is important about this use of ideology is that it is reminiscent of pre-Reform Era political strategy. As Wallace argues, it is a neopolitical turn. Similarly, as Minzner argues, it unravels much of what the Reform Era worked to institutionalize. Personally, I lean toward Wallace’s current assessment that the Reform Era has been shifted in a new direction, but has not ended. Many of the economic reforms brought about during this period would cause huge dissent if reversed. As for the social reforms and further democratization that typically accompanies globalization and economic reform, the CCP security apparatus has been continually suppressing this potential source of public dissent since Tiananmen. Thus, the heavy-handedness of Xi’s rule represents a bolstering of defense against unrest that will surely follow continued economic slowdown, while the core fundamentals of the institutionalization of economic reform will remain intact.
Authoritarianism 